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Abstract
This paper develops a means of visualising the vulnerability of complex systems
of financial interactions resulting from the changing risk tolerance of investors. The
investors’ risk behavior contributes to the buildup of vulnerability in crisis and in
calm periods. We show how both time-varying risk tolerance and spillover indices
can be translated into two-dimensional information transmission and crisis transmis-
sion maps, respectively. Taken together, the information transmission maps have
the advantage of highlighting potential crisis transmission pathways in the crisis
transmission maps. These maps provide clear visualization showing information
transmission predates crisis transmission drawing from conditional signed spillover
and risk tolerance indices computed from equity market data for 31 global markets
between 1998 and 2020. We examine if investors’ risk preference induces a crisis
and to what extent such a predictor may be related to a pandemic. Furthermore,
we take a special look at the Covid-19 pandemic and its impact on the dynamics of
systemic crisis transmission.
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1 Introduction
The many facets of global financial crises have heightened research interests in systemic
risk and contagion. In a contagious environment, investors expect higher returns for
holding risky assets. Indeed, investor preferences readily change in response to an increase
in the degree of total risks in a market as a crisis unveils. In this paper, we investigate
inter-temporal changes in investors risk tolerance responding to the degree of systemic
risk.
Dynamic information maps are proposed to visualise shifts in investors risk tolerance,
contributing to the build-up of systemic risks. Furthermore, we show how to use self-
clustering of nonlinear inputs of investor risk preferences across time to identify a crisis.
The expectation maximisation/artificial neural network based self-clustering maps high-
light information transmission pathways in a pool of markets in response to random
stimuli stemming from speculation or fear of crisis. The maps are analogous to slices of
brain scans lit up by firing neural pathways and, as such, are easily processed visually.
We show that the dynamic maps can be considered an extension of widely acceptable
risk estimates, and are easily conceivable by general practitioners in the risk manage-
ment spectrum. This method improves understanding of the role of frictional networks in
dampening resilience of any given country in the global market. We show that investors
analyse crisis-related information differently, which changes the corresponding risk toler-
ance, which generates further vulnerability in the market. Our objective is to allow risk
managers to control over information spread in times of crisis, and to simulate the effects
of an alternative intervention in the information pathway to detect best possible actions
to restrain unprecedented risk speculation exacerbating in any market. This, in turn,
helps to manage systemic risk for a recipient market in the system.
The main conjecture is news transmission predates crisis transmission. Here, investor risk
tolerance matrices represent a proxy to news transmission that is used in the production of
news transmission pathway and, are used to present a comparison with crisis transmission
pathway in a two dimensional plateau. Moreover, we provide evidence that past crises
are rife with overconfidence and fear. The paper addresses these concerns and model
the dynamics in signed risk tolerance corresponding to signed risk matrices, which also
produces predictive visual patterns to examine the ability of news transmission to predate
a crisis transmission pathway in a system of intricate web of the international markets.
The studies applying self-organising maps (SOMs) as a deep unsupervised learning process
to investigate systemic risks is uncommon and fairly new. For example, Resta (2016), pre-
sented financial market clusters with SOMs. While Marghescu et al. (2010); Barthélemy
(2011); Sarlin and Peltonen (2013) and Betz et al. (2014) popularised the use of SOMs
in finance, early papers had applied other artificial neural network methods attempting
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to make crisis predictions in a system of financial institutions or markets (Liu and Lind-
holm, 2006; Apolloni et al., 2009). However, Betz et al. (2014) argued that SOMs have
better prediction properties than traditional latent models, and contribute to an early
learning system in crises prediction.1 To our knowledge, this work is the first attempt to
investigate an information transmission pathway stemming from vulnerability dynamics
with SOMs, indicating the potential of crisis accumulation.
Our dataset encapsulates daily returns of the aforementioned markets from 1997 to 2020.
We use a balanced sample of 31 international equity markets: Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Canada, Chile, China, Croatia, Ecuador, France, Germany, Greece, India, Iraq, Ireland,
Israel, Japan, Kuwait, Malaysia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Portugal, Russia, Saudi
Arabia, Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Thailand, the Philippines, the USA, the UK
and Venezuela. We further classify our markets into groups based on similarity in macro-
economic fundamentals (or similar traits): export crisis, including markets from leading
export (oil and non-oil) countries, oil exporting emerging countries and oil exporting
developed countries; Greek debt crisis-affected European markets; and 1997 Asian crisis-
affected Asian markets. According to BIS (1998) and Baur and Schulze (2005) the USA
and Japan acted as conduits during many of the past events.2
Our sample spans 30 episodes of global crisis events which allows to show the difference
between all these critical periods. Some of the major crises are 1997-1998 Asian Finan-
cial Crisis & the collapse of Thai baht, that resulted in Thailand becoming effectively
bankrupt; 1998-2000 Russian financial crisis & devaluation of the ruble followed by Rus-
sian Central Bank defaulting on its debt; 2000-2002 Dot-Com bubble & Stock marker
crash in 2002 followed by excessive speculations prevalent in 1997-2000; September 2011
terrorist attack on the USA; 2003-2008 Global Energy Crisis & increasing tensions in Mid-
dle East together with rising concerns over oil price speculations followed by a significant
fall of US dollar resulted in oil prices rising abruptly, exceeding three time the initial price;
2003 when the SARS outbreak is first identified in Guangdong province in China, rapidly
becoming epidemic, slowing down economic interactions with China to many markets;
2006 Gaza conflict & Israel-Lebanon war broke out; 2007-2009 Global financial crisis &
subprime mortgage crisis followed by 2005 housing bubble burst; 2009-2012: Eurozone
crisis emerges in the wake of great recession in the late 2009, when several Eurozone mem-
bers (Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain, Cyprus) failed to bailout over-indebted banks and
repay foreign debt; 2014-2017 Russian crisis and the collapse of Russian ruble, followed
by economic sanctions imposed on Russia and the collapse of Russian stock markets; 2016
1For studies using SOMs in the field of financial crisis and risk management, see Liu and Lindholm
(2006); Peltonen (2006); Apolloni et al. (2009); Marghescu et al. (2010) and Betz et al. (2014), for
network mapping see Barthélemy (2011) and Sarlin and Peltonen (2013) and for market clustering see
Resta (2016).
2For details on the data used and the span of crises in our sample, see Table 1.
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Export Crisis as Germany, Chile, France, China, UK and Australia experience historic
decline in total exports, followed by a ‘oil-glut’; 2015-2016 Chinese crisis when a mas-
sive drop in Chinese stock markets resulted in markets terminating transactions in the
wake of concerns over a Chinese Crisis; 2013-present Venezuelan Crisis. Termed as the
Great depression of Venezuela, the deterioration of major macro economic indicators in
Venezuela since 2013 resulted in a significant social and political degradation. The extent
of this deterioration is such, that Venezuela topped the misery index 2013, and ranked
lowest by the IFC in investing country index. Finally the evolution of the COVID-19
crisis is analyzed.
Facing the onset of COVID-19, at the end of 2019, triggered numerous studies attempting
to identify the economic impact of the pandemic. While Mazzoleni et al. (2020); Wang
et al. (2020); Yarovaya et al. (2020) recognize the COVID-19 as a black swan and an un-
foreseeable event, Goodell (2020) contends COVID-19 is foreseeable and hence insurable.
Goodell (2020) discusses the papers identifying an emergence of pandemic and predicting
its enormous economic losses. Moreover, Goodell (2020) suggests, COVID-19 is directly
comparable to a large scale terrorist attack such as the 9/11 attack on the USA, which is
localised in its initial manifestation but by design is created to cause a global impact in
the investors’ moods in the financial markets. Such ‘spillover effect’ leading to systemic
contribution of such localised events into market risks are discussed in Hon et al. (2004);
Choudhry (2005); Karolyi (2006); Brounen and Derwall (2010); Nikkinen and Vähämaa
(2010); Chesney et al. (2011); Corbet et al. (2018). Interestingly, COVID-19, in its scope
and breadth, cannot be directly comparable to a global nuclear disaster only because the
outcome of a nuclear disaster is irrelevant as it is not survivable. COVID-19 is survivable
despite having different ramifications for different portions of economic spectrum. As the
impact of COVID-19 blankets global economies, it is crucial to investigate the spillover
effects in the public moods in the international financial markets.
We investigate a ‘calm before crisis’ phenomenon focusing on the information transmission
affecting risk propagation in the pre and during COVID-19 outbreak. We identify the
patters that clarify the role of market news and speculations since the COVID-19 recession
hit global economies.
• Calmness is prevailing in the dominant international markets, including South Ko-
rea, Germany, China, Australia, Belgium, the USA, Canada, Russia, Norway, and
Japan. The findings suggest that China is the ground zero of the pandemic which
means that an increase in aggregate risk aversion is not different from the other dom-
inant international markets. This is a natural phenomenon related to an imminent
economic downturn. It has become evident that the heightening of abnormalities
in Chinese economy are mere speculations.
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• Vulnerability dampened in the developed markets during the COVID-19 crisis. Nat-
urally, the increased disconnect emerged from the widespread expectation of a crisis
trigger. Unlike the disconnects during a systemic event, vulnerability for different
markets dampens differently, suggesting the effects of a more localised intervention.
Therefore, an exposure risk triggering a contagion is unlikely in this instance.
• Risk aggressiveness and market interconnections heighten for the developing mar-
kets. While a higher coupling of markets is related to higher vulnerability, this
also indicates the increased market activity in the developing markets and potential
spikes in liquidity transferring into these markets despite the COVID-19 outbreak.
• We do not find significant changes in the crisis transmission maps and information
transmission maps, during the COVID-19 crisis. Therefore, global markets did not
experience significant jumps in the stress classification index. However, we identify
cracks in the maps indicating a spike in risk aversion.
• Unlike the results related to the GFC, we do not detect new feedback loops forming
and sending random cracks across the maps. This provides additional evidence that
the pandemic poses no systemic threat.
In what follows, we present a brief review of the literature in Section 2. Data set is
explained in Section 3 followed by presentation of an empirical framework in Section 4.
We present the results from signed, unsigned spillovers and risk preference matrices in
Section 5. The findings from the self organising maps are shown in Section 6. Next, we
discuss the evolution of the markets during the COVID-19 crisis in Section 7 and Section
8, followed by policy implications in Section 9. Section 10 concludes the paper.
2 Literature Review
Piccotti (2017) argued that there exists a symbiotic relationship between contagion and
systemic risk.3 Endogenous credit and capital constraints turn non-systemic risks into
systemic risk as crisis propels through different markets followed by a reinforcing cycle.
Additionally, crisis propagation brings about temporal changes to aggregate elasticity
of temporal substitution affecting asset prices in different markets (Holmstrom and Ti-
role, 1996, 1997; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997; Longstaff and Wang, 2012; Elliott et al.,
2014; Shenoy and Williams, 2017). Hence, financial contagion increases all costs, as the
3Financial contagion defines the spread of market disturbances and poses a potential threat for
economies by attempting to integrate with international financial system. This also explains the ex-
tent to which a local crisis may propagate across neighbours and warrants investigation beyond real
economic factors. Conversely, systemic risk suggests the risks that exist within a system of nodes comes
from the strength of these nodes.
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marginal utility of consumption is negatively affected in the short-term for long-term in-
vestors. Consequently, investors short term holding time preference attributes a higher
price to contagion (Van Binsbergen et al., 2012, 2013; Belo et al., 2015). Drawing a
distinction, Piccotti (2017) suggested that financial contagion may positively affect the
marginal utility of consumption corresponding to assets with a longer holding period, sub-
sequently decreasing contagion costs while generating higher returns for risk-takers. In
fact we deal with a natural experiment to investigate the degree to which investors’ aggre-
gate risk-taking makes a less volatile market more contagious. In other words, we aim to
identify if high-risk spillovers are positively associated with high aggregate risk tolerance.
In addition, we account for similarity between homogeneous information transmission
corresponding to crisis transmission. This similarity may indicate the role of investors’
collective risk tolerance in building a crisis.
A plethora of studies has examined emergence of fundamental contagion in the last decade.
Fundamental contagion refers to risks that may lie within trade and financial linkages
between different economies (Longin and Solnik, 1995; Ang and Bekaert, 1999; Dooley
and Hutchison, 2009; Chiang et al., 2017). Goldstein (1998) proposed a ‘wake-up call’
hypothesis that outlines vulnerability of markets to crisis speculations. Bekaert et al.
(2013) provided evidence of ‘wake-up calls’ causing contagion in the post-GFC period.
Intuitively, it is easier to classify market susceptibility by clustering the markets by com-
monality in fundamentals. We believe the other type of contagion based on investor
behaviour is equally important for identifying crisis transmission channels.
Financial contagion studies have taken on greater urgency since the Asian financial crisis
of 1997, with little emphasis on investors’ risk tolerance as an important factor. In an
attempt to catalogue financial contagion papers, Seth and Panda (2018) reviewed 151
studies, only five of which discussed investor-based contagion as a key state variable
despite investor overreaction being central to crisis transmission. Chudik and Fratzscher
(2011) pointed out that the degree of investors risk tolerance coupled with the tightening
of liquidity as a conditional element in crisis, causes differing levels of transmission in
both emerging and developed markets. Mondria and Quintana-Domeque (2013) provided
empirical evidence that managers’ increasing attention to crisis countries heighten crisis
transmission. Dungey and Gajurel (2015) rationalised that herding behaviour fraught
with asymmetric information generates contagion from the USA to emerging markets.
In contrast, Shen et al. (2015) found that Chinese markets receive shocks during crisis,
more so from macroeconomic channels in the European markets than from investor based
contagion.
Investor-based contagion is primarily caused by dynamics in investors’ risk perceptions
and risk appetite, which determines how investors re-allocate investments internationally
(Masson, 1998; Dornbusch et al., 2000; Forbes and Rigobon, 2002). On the one hand,
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dampening risk tolerance may lead to frequent re-balancing of investor portfolios (Kodres
and Pritsker, 2002b; Fleming et al., 1998). Conversely, magnification in risk tolerance
drives investments towards more riskier asset allocation (Kocaarslan et al., 2017), which
simultaneously pushes the prices of risky assets upward. Such contagion resurges due to
the restructuring of portfolios by investors, and less so due to market swings (Kumar and
Persaud, 2002).
The dynamics in information channels largely drives portfolio rebalancing. Homogeneous
information affects investors’ risk perceptions, which are induced from cross-market hedg-
ing (Fleming et al., 1998) and increasing interconnectedness between markets. However,
Kodres and Pritsker (2002b) argued that risk transmission depends highly on information
asymmetry coupled with shared macro-economic risks. In this paper, we split our markets
based on both shared macro-economic history and macro-economic risks. We order the
markets to separate out emerging markets in which information asymmetry may dictate.
Information transmission stimulates active hedging by invoking frequent asset realloca-
tion by investors, which heightens in crisis periods compared to calm periods. This, in
turn, increases interdependence (Lehkonen and Heimonen, 2014). Lehkonen and Hei-
monen (2014) argued that for active investors (e.g., large investment banks) are mostly
driven by shorter-term dynamics, whereas passive investors (e.g., individuals, insurance
companies and commercial banks) are driven by longer-term dynamics with a higher risk
tolerance. Therefore, during stable periods interconnection remains neutral to an extent
that hedging in the markets are driven by information symmetry. Conversely, during
crisis periods, risk-takers and risk-averse investors alike participate in active hedging in
fear of diminishing portfolio values (Kodres and Pritsker, 2002b; Kocaarslan et al., 2017).
Aggressive portfolio rebalancing on top of perceived increases in information asymmetry
elevate linkages in global networks.
Muir (2017) distinguished between the effects stemming from a financial crisis recession,
deep recession and war events and investors’ expectations regarding asset values, risk
premiums and liquidity in the market. In the vast literature, financial crisis is defined
as build-up of systemic risk corresponding to a banking crisis (Shrieves and Dahl, 1992;
Sbracia and Zaghini, 2003; Lepetit et al., 2008; Allen and Carletti, 2010; Puri et al.,
2011; De Bruyckere et al., 2013; Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2013; Dungey and Gajurel, 2015).
Muir (2017) argued that risk premiums are a more dominant factor than capital during
a financial crisis, indicating equities are better determinants of a crisis. Moreover, a
bank’s liquidity buffer dampens during a recession, deep recession, war-related events
and financial crisis alike, creating confusion regarding separating the effects from financial
crisis alone. Only swings in the risk premiums are collinear to the degree of financial crisis.
Notably, Muir (2017) pointed out that immediately after a crisis, realised returns increase,
reversing the drag on wealth; however, this is unlikely in a recession.
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Lee et al. (2015) also invoked the phenomenon of risk aversion to explain the determining
factors of risk premiums. They argued for the importance of investors’ risk preferences to
determine asset pricing, active reallocation of assets in a portfolio and the varying degree
of risk management. Hurd et al. (2011) suggested that active portfolio reallocation is
determined mostly by systematic variations in assets, reflecting investorsâĂŹ risk pref-
erences. The lack of empirical evidence concerning risk preference during crisis provides
a natural experiment for us to disentangle the dynamics of risk aversion in association
with exogenous shocks and systemic risk effects. By doing so, we gain further insights
into the role and evolution of the degree of investors’ risk preferences in the pre, during
and post-crisis periods.
The information channel is imperative to separate out the crisis propagation pathway,
similar to risk premiums corresponding to investors’ expectations about the market and
overreactions to crisis-related information (Malmendier and Nagel, 2011; Barberis et al.,
2015). Thus, financial crisis is better identified using investors’ expectations of the market
than using risks associated with bank liquidity.
Most recently, the importance of information flow in the build-up of financial crisis was
explained with ‘order-disorder phase transition’, a term adopted by Bossomaier et al.
(2018). During stable periods, markets become disordered due to heterogeneity in in-
vestors’ information-based decision-making process. In contrast, both exogenous and
endogenous crises stimulate coordinated and collective decision-making with individual
investors, bringing more order to the market. Here, endogenous crisis is likely to represent
an amplification in mutual information sharing among investors (Matsuda et al., 1996;
Gu et al., 2007; Barnett et al., 2013) .
A predictive indicator that would amplify before transitioning into a crisis is longed for
in the literature. In line with that purpose, our information transmission maps visu-
ally discern endogenous and exogenous crises. Exogenous crises are mapped with small
reinforcing circles as laid out in Muir (2017), whereas the abnormalities in nonlinear
clustering represented with contrasting colours indicate endogenous crises. The economic
prior underlying the closed circles address the undirected cyclic graph, a process involv-
ing a unique neural connectedness feeding off each other within random patterns. The
identification of unique cycles bears some evidence, but only if such cyclic shapes suggest
the onset of a crisis propagation, which is analogous to a ripple effect.
3 Data
We draw on daily dollar denominated stock price indices for 31 equity markets from
Asia, the Pacific, Europe, the Americas and the Middle East for the period 1 January,
1998 until 09 June, 2020. Our data are sourced from Thompson Reuters Datastream.
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The descriptive statistics on the filtered data is presented in Table 2. We do not find
significant correlation in the residuals, ruling out inconsistency in our sample data.
We estimate returns using first difference of natural logarithms. As suggested by Forbes
and Rigobon (2002) and Hyndman and Athanasopoulos (2014) we scale down the time
zone difference by filtering our data with two day moving averages. In principal, moving
averages filtering reduces white noise optimally by focusing out the sharpest edge points.
This guideline follows the relevant network and finance literature (Joseph et al., 2017;
Zhong and Enke, 2017; Elliott and Timmermann, 2016; Chen et al., 2016; Ferreira and
Santa-Clara, 2011; Vaisla and Bhatt, 2010; Atsalakis and Valavanis, 2009; Cont, 2001;
Granger, 1992; Balvers et al., 1990; Fama, 1976).
The importance of using equity returns in empirical studies for distinguishing the prop-
erties between indicators has been discussed in detail in the relevant literature. While
Cont (2001) focused on non-linearity and persistence, Granger (1992) pointed out the
non-stationary properties of financial data. In the past, Fama (1976) provided evidence
of daily returns being more non-Gaussian compared to intra-day returns. Recently, asset
returns have been reported by Joseph et al. (2017) to have non-Gaussian, time-varying,
persistent characteristics with smooth compact support over low-frequency spectral con-
tent. In contrast Zhong and Enke (2017); Wollschlager and Schäfer (2016); Joseph et al.
(2011); Atsalakis and Valavanis (2009); Joseph and Larrain (2008) contended that daily
returns are highly non-linear, volatile and negatively skewed. Despite the scientific dis-
course, the benefits of using asset returns with appropriate pre-processing outweighs its
harms in financial economics.
Additionally, filtering with MA is well supported by the literature. As Joseph et al.
(2017) suggested that MA filtering increases the quality for both continuous or discrete
time series in both time and frequency domains. Smith (1997) also provides evidence of
MA handling discrete time series with greater accuracy but in a less complicated manner.
Research into systemic risk and predictive modelling widely uses asset return indica-
tors, and applies both non-parametric self-learning techniques and parametric statistical
methods (Joseph et al., 2017; Zhong and Enke, 2017; Joseph et al., 2016; Elliott and
Timmermann, 2016; Chen et al., 2016; Ferreira and Santa-Clara, 2011; Vaisla and Bhatt,
2010; Atsalakis and Valavanis, 2009; Cont, 2001; Granger, 1992; Balvers et al., 1990).
We complement Joseph et al. (2017, 2016); Atsalakis and Valavanis (2009) and Zhong
and Enke (2017) by pre-processing our data with an appropriate window choice with the
aim to avoid aberrations caused by discontinuations in returns data. We complement
Oppenheim and Schafer (2014) and Forbes and Rigobon (2002) who reported the best
results with window size 2; this also underpins the ‘spectral windowing’ theory.
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4 Empirical framework
In this section, we estimate risk tolerance parameters using a univariate GARCH in mean
model for each of the returns indices in the sample to understand the degree to which
the transmission is received by the index in the interconnected network. In other words,
we are examining if the swings in vulnerability during a crisis period are led by investors’
risk preference at any given time. In what follows, we estimate unsigned spillover indices
and model risk in daily returns with respect to estimated vulnerability indices.
To begin with, we need to estimate the vulnerability indices from unsigned spillover
indices. The Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) proposed n-step ahead forecast error variance
decomposition matrix in a VAR framework categorises unsigned connectedness between
N covariance stationary variables with orthogonal shocks. Here, the summation of all
non-diagonal elements produce estimates of transmissions and vulnerabilities of i with
respect to j. The form of VAR(p) is as follows
xt =
p∑
i=1
ϕixt−i + εt
Here xt is a return vector xt = (x1.t,....xN.t)
′, ϕ is a N ×N parameter matrix in this model
and ε˜t, N(0, Σ); while
xt =
∞∑
i=0
Aiεt−i.
is the moving average representation where
Ai = φ1Ai−1 + φ2Ai−2 + . . .+ φPAi−p
and rewriting this gives
xt =
∞∑
i=0
(AiP )
(
P−1εt−1
)
=
∞∑
i=0
(AiP ) (ε˜t−i) =
∑
i=0
A˜iε˜t−i
P is a lower triangular Cholesky factor. Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) exploits generalized
VAR framework originally proposed by Koop et al. (1996) and calibrates the current
model using KPPS H-step-ahead FEVD that circumvents the ordering issue. Denoting
this by θgij (H) gives
θgij (H) =
a−1jj
∑H−1
h=0
(
e
′
iAh
∑
ej
)2∑H−1
h=0
(
e
′
iAh
∑
A
′
hei
)
The variance-covariance matrix is
∑
, the standard deviation of residuals is ajj, the moving
average (infinite) coefficient from VAR is denoted by Ah and ej is a selection vector. Yet,∑N
j=1 θ˜
g
ij (H) 6= 1, further normalization gives
θ˜gij (H) =
θgij (H)∑N
j=1 θ
g
ij (H)
.
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After normalization
∑N
j=1 θ˜
g
ij (H) = 1, and
∑N
i,j=1 θ˜
g
ij (H) = N . We fetch the uncondi-
tional spillovers measuring off-diagonal elements added up proportional to all elements
added up. The unconstrained directional return spillover of all to i is constructed as
Si←all (H) =
∑N
j=1,j 6=i θ˜
g
ij (H)
N
× 100
and in the opposite direction with Si→all for all parameters θ˜gji (H).
Now, with spillover indices in hand the vulnerability index is obtained. We estimate the
dynamics between return and risk with a bivariate GARCH-M model presented here.
We begin by estimating the expected return of indices regarding its risk when exogenous
shock from return spillover received from others rspilloverfrom,t is added to the following
model.
µi,t = γ0 + γ1rspilloverfrom,t + ϕσ
ρ
i,t
Later we re-analyse the model with roil,t to examine the effect of return shocks corre-
sponding to the oil index with
µi,t = γ0 + γ1roil,t + ϕσ
ρ
i,t
The uni-variate GARCH in mean model is
σ2i,t = α0 + α1υ
2
i,t−1 + β1σ
2
i,t−1
where vi,t = ri,t − µi,t. The parameters to estimate here are θ = {γ0, ϕ, ρ, α0, αiβi}. Here
ρ > 0, the estimated parameter ϕ gives us Risk Aversion if ϕ > 0, Risk Neutrality if ϕ = 0
and Risk Taking if ϕ < 0. The parameters are estimated by maximising the negative
log-likelihood function
ln lt (θ) = −N
2
ln (2pi)− 1
2
lnσ2t −
1
2
ln z2,
with the standardised residual zi,t =
vi,t
σi,t
. We perform tests of risk-neutrality using the
Wald test by testing the restriction ϕ = 0. Here, the null hypothesis is H0 : ϕ̂i,t = 0
against the alternative hypothesis H1 : ϕ̂i,t > 0. We perform our analysis N times, gener-
ating risk aversion indices alongside the significant test results. With forward propagation
we compute vulnerability indices for each market. In the next, we show how to obtain
the signed spillover index which complements the risk aversion indices.
4.1 Generalized Historic Decomposition (GHD)
Dungey et al. (2017) proposed a signed spillover index, that overcome the limitations of
unsigned spillover indices proposed by Diebold and Yilmaz (2012). This signed spillover
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discerns both the magnification and dampening effects of contemporaneous shocks in
the markets compared to unsigned estimations. Here, Aij measures the connectedness
elements due to shocks in j related to the fraction of variation of i. We use a VAR discussed
in the previous section to estimate moving average parameters Aj and to obtain impulse
responses IRF s. The historical decomposition matrix at time t+ j is estimated as
GHDt+j =
j−1∑
i=0
IRFi  At+j−i +
∞∑
i=j
IRFi  At+j−i, (1)
where IRFi are one unit impulse responses (non-orthogonalised),  is the Hadamard
product between two matrices. GHD measures the signed weights of shocks by simply
estimating impulse responses weighted by residuals. We extract the TO and FROM
signed spillovers from row and column elements of matrix GHD. In what follows, we
generate self-organizing maps (SOM) that rely on neural networks estimated from risk
aversion indices.
4.2 Dynamic-mapping
We examine the effect of information propagation in exacerbating a crisis for a mar-
ket facing a high degree of systemic risk with multiple levels of risk sensitivity using
self-organizing information maps (henceforth SOM information). The changing position of
nodes during N recursive estimation illustrates the direction of information propagation
that may lead to a heightening of systemic risks in the following period.
SOM information is a class of deep unsupervised clustering that meets expected minimi-
sation criteria across weights. Presented with input nodes (in this case risk aversion
indices with systemic risk as a covariate) across two-dimensional Euclidean space, the
classic backwardâĂŞforward propagation, in linear combination with nonlinear functions,
project estimated weights drawn from least distances with expected cluster centres onto
a compressed space of squared dimension. This process is initialised with multi-nominal
probabilistic distribution. In summary, the recursive process outlined in the computa-
tions group the input arrays into intermediate arrays, reducing the dimension of inputs.
Convergence results in lower-dimensional classifiers/outputs. Overall, the SOM method
clusters nonlinear inputs better than K-means clustering. (Clark et al., 2014; Kohonen,
1998)4
The algorithm starts from the principal component surface populating a lattice with an
array of random /stochastic gradient weights.5 Next, the recursive optimisation con-
verges to local minima scanning across all data points and, in doing so, updates centres
4K-means clustering remains better in clustering linear inputs.
5The weights are assigned onto each data point in the input vector. The process involving activation
of objective function is a multi-class generalisation process. Optimising the objective function, known as
network training, is analogous to polynomial curve fitting as the target vector is Gaussian. The algorithm
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on the lattice. The convergence is reached when least distant outputs from input nodes
by changing of their weights is achieved and is denoted the ‘best matching units’ (BMU)
(the analytic gradients of the weights construct the popularised hidden layers of edges).
In other words, the nearest neighbours are assigned higher weights in a neighbourhood
space, resulting in the centres forming a sphere around the lattice. In the process, BMUs
are computed in a two-dimensional space by minimising Euclidean norm, gradually form-
ing a sphere of nodes, in which the distance between nodes i and j is computed as
ε =
√∑n
j,i=0 (vi − ωj)2. Finally, a map is retrieved by presenting the sphere in a two-
dimensional grid of neurons to which the non-linear structure in input data is optimally
fitted.
The ‘sequential processing’ of the algorithm ensures that each weight is updated with
its corresponding input nodes and propagated backwards in the base using the updating
function,
wt+1 = ωt + θtσtεt.
The updates are scaled with the learning rate and influence rate σt for curve fitting.
Finally, the influence rate6 depicts the influence of each weight on the classifiers:
θt = e
− ε2
2σ2t

The influence rate assigns non-zero units for BMUs and decreases if the distance between
the nodes in BMUs increase. This is analogous to multi-nomial probabilistic classification.
We generate an information map following the methods suggested by Sarlin and Peltonen
(2013). Upon nonlinear convergence, the maps resemble sparsity, no event illuminate with
lighter colours. Failure to do so presents a high degree of nonlinear cycles, represented
by the darker regions. The picture that emerges shows an event is transpiring in the
information transmission pathway compared to no events occurring. Technically, this map
is known as ‘iris flower map’ clustering, which is observed with darker colours compared
to converging clusters with lighter colours. Here, (x, y) locations represent the positions
of the markets’ nodes in the two-dimensional representation.
5 Empirical results
Now we conjecture which macro-economic factors determine the dynamic co-movement
of global markets in times of crisis. This discussion leads to the argument that volatility
is targeted to minimise the loss function (target-prediction) by updating gradients of node weights in a
sequential process of backward-forward propagation.
6This rate substitutes the popularised score function in generalised neural network architecture.
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amplification in the market during crisis indicates a dilemma on the proportion of conta-
gion identifying crisis propagation relative to other macro-economic factors (Kocaarslan
et al., 2017). Recent studies have attempted to explain financial contagion, and investor
sentiment has made its way into recent empirical research (Corsetti et al., 2005; Boyer
et al., 2006; Chiang et al., 2007; Syllignakis and Kouretas, 2011; Celık, 2012). Kodres
and Pritsker (2002a) pointed out that information asymmetry is minimal in calm periods
and leads to reduced hedging activities. In contrast, investors expect positive jumps in
information linkage dynamics during crisis periods. Further, the selective shifting of funds
across global markets and alternative investment areas, such as oil, eventually heightens
systemic risks for any given market. Recently, Kocaarslan et al. (2017) stated that impor-
tant macro-economic factors may only affect crisis propagation in global markets through
investors’ expectations of information linkage and reactions to information dynamics.
In this section, we contribute to this strand of literature by presenting the dynamics of
investors’ risk perception corresponding to signed spillover indices across crisis and calm
periods. We also produce dynamic information maps explaining information linkages
during such periods. These findings, combined with systemic risk analysis, improves
understanding of crisis propagation across the markets.
We classify our markets into Asian crisis (AC), Greek crisis (GC), export crisis (EC)
markets, oil exporting developed (OED) and oil exporting emerging (OEE). We present
the signed risk neutrality indices juxtaposed against signed spillovers (TO and FROM),
respectively, in Figure 1, Figure 2, Figure 3, Figure 4 and Figure 5. In doing
so, we examine the dynamics in investors’ risk tolerance corresponding to the degree of
transmission and vulnerability in any given period. Hence, we understand how readily
available information corresponding to dynamics of postulated crisis changes in investors’
risk tolerance. Further, the order of the clusters is maintained in the axes of dynamic
maps capturing the information transmissions.
We clearly demonstrate the changing interconnectedness affecting investors’ risk toler-
ance. We use risk tolerance, risk preference, risk sensitivity and aggregate risk behaviour
interchangeably for the remainder of the paper. Periods of crisis can be distinguished by
the widening gaps between transmission and vulnerability. A discerning feature in the
figures is the higher gaps that are exerted on dynamic risk tolerance during crisis periods,
indicating that investors’ risk preference readily changes with the degree to which a crisis
is interconnected. In general, high-level risk-taking is derived from the figures during
turmoil periods, which is consistent with Dungey et al.’s (2010a). The heightening in
risk-taking may indicate the contribution of investors’ heightened reaction during a cri-
sis period, which contributes to exacerbating the crisis transmission and accompanying
amplifications in vulnerability. This finding is in line with the suggestions outlined by
(Chudik and Fratzscher, 2011; Mondria and Quintana-Domeque, 2013).
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5.1 Asian markets
In this section, we examine the signed spillovers against the risk neutrality index pre-
sented in Figure 1 to discover whether investors’ aggressiveness affects the degree of
systemic risk in the AC markets cluster. In this cluster, we include India, the Philip-
pines, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore and South Korea. These countries’ markets are
selected to investigate the systemic risk dynamics corresponding to multiple events of cri-
sis since the Asian financial crisis. We further postulate crisis originating from investors’
risk preference, driven by accessible crisis-related information.
First, for India and the Philippines, we find both markets laid dormant in terms of in-
vestors’ aggressiveness, except for the periods leading from the 1997 Asian financial crisis.
Both markets remain vulnerable to changes in other markets while the corresponding risk
aversion remain dominant. Further, we find that while vulnerability plunges for India in
the periods following the GFC, the transmissions pick up. However, the Indian investors
remain mostly risk averse. It is only after the European crisis that Indian investors’ risk
tolerance amplifies. We discern similar patterns all the more for the Philippines. How-
ever, in Figure 6 we find the p value from the Wald test remains in the region of not
rejecting the null of risk neutrality in the Asian financial crisis, but starts to shift towards
the region against the null of risk neutrality. We find this holds more so for the Philip-
pines in the post-GFC period. Both markets cement the notion that markets may remain
vulnerable even with low risk tolerant investors. Additionally, higher risk tolerance may
further fuel risk transmissions to other markets.
Next, from the signed spillover indices we find that vulnerability dominates in Malaysia
and Thailand across the sample period. The only exception is a strong upswing in trans-
mission from Thailand in the post-European crisis period. The investors in both markets
largely demonstrate strong risk neutrality. The graphs show a pull towards risk-taking
during and after the GFC. This corresponds to a Wald significance test lying around the
risk neutrality region, with the significance curve moving away from risk neutrality only
after the GFC.
Then, we identify strong contrast in the risk tolerance for Singapore and South Korea. De-
spite similarity in the transmission and vulnerability derived from signed spillover indices
for both markets, investors in Singapore are highly aggressive compared to investors from
South Korea, who are mostly risk averse in the post-GFC period. This leads to higher
vulnerability for Singapore compared to South Korea. Moreover, a more significant shift
from the null of risk neutrality with accompanying jumps from these two markets show
investors become either more risk averse or more risk aggressive.
In all cases from Figure 1, we find that Asian investors transition from risk neutral to
risk-taking with the heightening of accompanying vulnerability, especially after the GFC.
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5.2 Export markets
In this section, we discuss the cluster representing countries affected by plunging total
exports since 2016. We consider Germany, France, Australia, China, Chile and the UK.
We investigate the signed systemic risk indicators while also presenting in Figure 2
investors’ risk positions in these markets, which we believe are responsible for higher
systemic risks.
First, we find both vulnerability and transmissions for Germany and France are mutually
exclusive. The degree of transmission for Germany remains higher than for France, es-
pecially during the GFC. Conversely, France remains resilient in the post-European debt
crisis, which contrasts with German patterns. Although, Figure 2 depicts a higher risk
tolerance for France comparing to Germany, Figure 6 shows a diminishing significance
for risk tolerance in Germany, and investors in both markets are predominantly neutral
across the sample.
Next, the Australian transmission is intense across important crisis periods, especially
during the GFC and, more recently, at the onset of Chinese crisis. The accompanying
vulnerability levels indicate that with jumps in risk transmissions, Australia becomes
more susceptible to in-shocks. While the corresponding investor sensitivity seems to lean
towards high-risk preferences among investors, risk significance indicates that investors
respond with higher aggregate risk tolerance. This corresponds to jumps in risks, and
even more so in the post-GFC period. Overall, Australian investors prefer to remain risk
neutral in calm periods.
Furthermore, we find China becomes more resilient, especially during the recent Chi-
nese crisis. We identify the strengthening of such resilience when compared to a similar
combination of transmission and vulnerability during the GFC. Investors’ aggregate risk
tolerance decreases in the risk preference index, with the corresponding significance in-
dex depicting a shift towards the direction of risk aversion, while risk neutrality remains
highly significant.
Turning to the remainder of the markets in this cluster, Chile and the UK both remain
resilient to negative in-shocks. However, this is dictated by stronger transmissions from
the UK, as the UK market nodes are located near high-risk markets, referred elsewhere.
Risk preference in the Chilean market turns towards the extreme, although a significance
test does not hold. For Chile, significant risk-taking is evident during tumultuous times
only. In contrast, risk-taking as an aggregate behaviour dominates over the British market
in the risk preference index, which is in line with the gauged significance, especially since
the onset of the GFC.
In all the markets discussed in Figure 2, the patterns accord well with the fact that
risk-taking increases corresponding to amplifications in systemic risk propagation during
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periods of turmoil, with investors remaining neutral in other times. In other words,
investors’ access to crisis-related information fuels herding or risk tolerance further in
the market. This, in turn, propagates stronger shocks to other markets by building up
systemic risks, consequently serving as a propagation channel for future crises.
5.3 Markets related to Greece
In Figure 3, we demonstrate the spillovers from countries that were primarily affected by
the European crisis, coupled with risk neutrality estimates. The countries are Greece,
Portugal, Ireland, Belgium, Croatia and Austria. Jumps in the risk tolerance curve
correspond well with signed spillover indices, signifying its importance in driving the
dynamics in the degrees of systemic over time.
The risk preference index for Croatia, Austria and Ireland depicts opposing directional
changes in the pre- and post-GFC periods. As the GFC unfolds, the Croatian risk prefer-
ence index shows amplification in risk tolerance. In contrast, Austria and Ireland markets
respond with a dampening risk tolerance. The significance curves support the patterns
presented here by showing the curves moving away from the null of risk neutrality for
Croatia and moving towards risk neutrality for Austria and Ireland. The corresponding
gaps in the spillovers with the risk preference curves widen. This explains that higher
risk-taking prior to a crisis fuels systemic risks further during a crisis despite investors’
changing preferences when faced with a crisis. We conjecture that higher risk aversion
during crisis results the markets falling further into a disaster. This is particularly true
in the pre-GFC era; we identify a strong dampening of risk tolerance during each crisis
period that is preceded by amplitudes in risk tolerance as shown in Figure 3. The corre-
sponding systemic risk estimates demonstrate sharper swings in recent years, especially
in transmissions from Croatia.
From Figure 3, initially we find a commonality in the risk sensitivity patterns of Portugal
and Belgium because both the countries’ investors are leaning naturally towards risk
aversion from high-level risk-taking prior to the GFC. Nonetheless, the significance index
presented in Figure 6 shows inconsistent risk aversion significance for Belgium, while
depicting consistent significance for Portugal. This leads to build-up in resilience and
corresponding gradual deceleration in transmission of risks from these markets, which
affirms that an overall shift of investors’ sentiment towards lower risk tolerance may lead
to less propagation of shocks across markets.
Finally, examining the Greek curves, we find that investors in Greece are predominantly
risk averse, especially since the USA subprime crisis sends the European markets into
a downward spiral. We also show that despite Greece being a strong transmitter of
shocks at the onset of European crisis, multiple austerity measures push the transmission
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down while simultaneously amplifying Greece’s vulnerability to the rest of the world. In
response, the high risk taking investors become risk neutral.
We suggest several points from this cluster. First, we show that a complete shift from risk
aggressiveness to risk neutrality comes about due to a crisis, leading to resilience building
for the concerned market. Second, we demonstrate that markets in this block are more
vulnerable and investors are mostly risk averse. Third, we observe that repeated austerity
measures suppress the transmission coming out from Greece, turning its investors risk
neutral but at a cost of resilience to in-shocks. Next, we discuss oil exporting markets for
both emerging and developing countries.
5.4 Oil exporting markets
Now, we discuss the countries that dominate the global oil markets. We cluster the
countries in terms of economy sizes and characteristics. The OED cluster consists of
the markets from the USA, Canada, Russia, Norway, Japan and New Zealand, and we
discuss them in Figure 4. The OEE cluster comprises Saudi Arabia, Israel, Iraq, Sri
Lanka, Nigeria and Venezuela, which we in Figure 5.
In Figure 4, we show that both Norway and New Zealand are both more resilient than
others in this cluster. While Norway remains a big spreader, we find that since the GFC,
New Zealand is becoming increasingly like a spreader. Consequently, New Zealand’s vul-
nerability soars with the accompanying increase in risk tolerance among investors. In
contrast, Norwegian investors show a diminishing pattern of risk tolerance. The sig-
nificance index is consistent with the Norwegian pattern of risk preference, and is less
consistent with the pattern emerging from New Zealand.
In terms of investorsâĂŹ risk tolerance, the Japanese and Canadian markets contrast
sharply with the Russian market. In Figure 4, we show that both Japanese and Cana-
dian investors are high risk takers for most part of the sample period. Moreover, the
significance test on risk sensitivity for the Japanese market gives increasing support to-
wards Japanese investors becoming high risk takers since the GFC. However, this does
not hold for the Canadian and Russian markets. Additionally, for both the Japanese
and Canadian markets, the corresponding transmissions outweigh vulnerability. How-
ever, the Japanese swings are sharper in both directions compared to Canada, mostly
during a global event. In contrast, the Russian investors are risk averse, and since the
post-Russian crisis in 1998, the degree of transmission and vulnerability starts falling.
Russian systemic risks did not amplify during the GFC; moreover, transmissions from
Russia flatten out since 2008. In all cases, vulnerability remains low for these markets.
Hence, we can conclude that with increasing risk tolerance, Japanese investors are con-
tributing in the markets’ ascending vulnerability since the global meltdown. Conversely,
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Russian and Canadian investors are less and play an important role in cooling down the
risk propagation into their own markets.
Finally, we find a phenomenal amplification in the transmission swings from the USA
during global meltdown, before it reverts back to normal level. Thereafter, we do not see
such intensity in the vulnerability swings of the USA. Investors from the USA remain risk
takers with brief intermissions towards risk neutrality in post-turmoils across the sample
period. Figure 6 suggests that USA investors are becoming more risk tolerant again as
the economy recovers from the meltdown.
Turning to the OEE markets, we can suggest unequivocally that investors in all the
markets are largely less risk tolerant, at least up until the emergence of the European
crisis. We find the only exceptions are for Israel when the GFC erupts, and for Iraq in the
post-GFC period. We also find a slowing down of transmission and vulnerability levels in
recent years for all the Middle Eastern markets. However, Figure 5 shows that increases
in vulnerability accompanies a heightening of risk tolerance for Nigeria since the European
crisis. Conversely, the Venezuelan market drops flat with the economy spiralling down
and, as such, only transmissions emit with liquidity flight. Risk neutrality for this market
indicates little or no market activities, which may also hold for Iraq.
In all, we find that increases in vulnerability alone generally cannot be associated with
lower risk tolerance, but may play an important role in subduing a transpiring crisis.
However, transmission and vulnerability both amplify if investors in the markets facing
a crisis are high risk takers. We conjecture that an increase in aggregate risk tolerance is
caused more by friction, which increases systemic risk taking.
6 Self-organising maps
6.1 Crisis transmission maps
In this section, we present a visualisation of a least-resistant shock transmission pathway
in the network of our markets, which can be considered an extension of vulnerability
detection in network finance. This method proposes an easy visualisation of the complex
structure of holistic associated network in our sample markets by producing maps similar
to slices of brain scans lit up by firing neural pathways. We further compare the least
resistant shock transmission pathway with the neural pathway lit up by changes in investor
sentiments corresponding to information available to the investors at any point. By doing
so, we provide evidence of an information transmission pathway preparing the way for
crisis transmission across the adjacent pathways.
We contribute to the literature by producing visualisations of high-dimensional inputs by
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condensing matrices of both signed spillover gauges and signed risk neutrality measures
into the meaningful self-organising clusters SOM crisis and SOM information, respectively.
We begin by slicing the complete rectangular matrix into 40 successive windows, yielding
a total of 80 maps capturing the dynamics in the association of crisis build-up and the
underlying changes in information transmission. In Figure 7, Figure 8, Figure 9,
Figure 10 we present the dynamic crisis transmission maps produced with signed spillover
matrices and in Figure 11, Figure 12, Figure 13, Figure 14 we present the signed risk
sensitivity indices gauged with multivariate GARCH optimisation. In the SOM dynamic
representations, the horizontal and vertical scales give the individual markets and the
markets in their respective clusters.
We propose to interpret the SOM crisis by drawing on an analogy of a plateau: mild
dark colours represent fissures in the plateau, while the degree of vector quantisation are
represented by light-dark-coloured neural pathways across the map. In addition to this
interpretation, if shocks evincing a crisis are analogous to a flash storm in the system,
then the rainwater naturally infiltrates through the fissures and sinkholes. Hence, the
visible pathways represent the least-resistant pathway of crisis or crisis-related information
transmission. In other words, a higher degree of risk build-up or substantial changes in
investor sentiments about the market are condensed out with darker colours, for such
extreme conditions are scaled with strong prior gauges in the SOM process.
Figure 7, Figure 8, Figure 9 and Figure 10 depict the dynamics in crisis maps, with
splicing of the sample time frame to semiannual crisis maps produced each time from the
signed spillover gauges, which show the evolving vulnerability in the changing networks.
Since the first half of 1998, the Asian financial crisis spurs a complicated web of fissures
connecting networks that emerge, corresponding to a crisis. We find coverings open up,
outlining vulnerability surges from Asia to the European markets, Australia and China.
Additionally, fissures creep up along the Greek crisis to the OEE markets across the
plateau, forming an italic ‘v’ shape. The picture that emerges may reflect the effects on
these economies of the slowdown of global resource trade with Asia. This complex feature
begins to ease out in the first half of 2001, forming fissures that give a parabolic pattern
running across the entire plateau. A key to this visualisation is this pattern, predominant
in all calm periods, forming ground water mounds running from end to end. In the advent
of a crisis, we find that, in keeping with our analogy, coverings open up and the flash storm
(i.e., unprecedented shocks) gives rapid dissipation of ephemeral ground water mounds
into lower discharge areas. In other words, new depressions in the plateau underscore
vulnerability transmitting from sources to predominantly less vulnerable markets. In
such circumstances, the common parabolic pattern in the fissures become less visible. We
outline some of such changes in the local topographic depressions.
During the first half of the dotcom bubble crisis, a stream passes through a crevasse with
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a significant void. This is evident in the OED plot axes and continues right up across AC
and GC until the latter half of 2002, shifting the crevasse carrying storm-water from the
AC to GC blocks in the axes.
Facing the USA mortgage-backed securities crisis, the fissure changes shape from the
common parabolic pattern to the italic ‘v’ pattern, and is also found earlier during the
Asian financial crisis. This highlights the predictive power of the changing shapes on the
plateau, indicating imminent, large-scale crises. As the crisis emerges into a full-scale
global crisis, the bedrock in our plateau (analogous to systems of VAR) becomes riddled
with openings. From a bird’s eye view, the topographic depressions indicate the sheer
fragility of the entire plateau, reaching a melting point corresponding to global meltdown.
The parabolic pattern in the fissures is lost again with European crisis emerging in 2010.
The plateau cracks open, creating a new crevasse with significant voids from GC contin-
uing right up to the OED markets. The parabolic pattern in the fissures re-emerge in
early 2011, and remain up until late 2014 when the topography begins to change shape.
Since early 2015, cracks and sinkholes continue to open up in the areas underneath the
parabolic pattern with a new web of fissures creeping up unlike before. Although it seems
the dislodging of the bedrock is more severe in the OED to AC and in the AC to OED
and GC, late 2017 especially shows a complete melting point with deep cracks running
all across the plateau. Next, we try to discover whether investors’ access to information
precede crevasse formation by using a similar analogy with the information transmission
maps.
7 Information transmission maps
According to Wilcox and Fabozzi (2013), the complex network of feedback loops in inter-
connected financial markets is naturally disguised by frictions in the system. The issue of
erratic market operations leading to the build-up of systemic risks across, not only invest-
ments but also multiple investors, is better understood through the collective sentiments
of a network of investors. The essence of this network is that the system is acyclical and,
hence, has signals (e.g., the many types of information that investors use as a ‘rule of
thumb’ to take selling and buying decisions, including expected returns on investment,
asset prices, trading volume and expected credit worthiness) that naturally pass through
intermediaries. In doing so, the signals that are transmitted out of these channels are
overlain with frictions, as those intermediaries may choose to transmit signals that ac-
cumulate above a threshold. This leads to similar directions in investors’ actions. The
resultant investor herding behaviour amplifies the effect of a positive feedback loop, which
can be considered a contagion of investors’ actions. Moreover, together with the lack of
an early warning approach that makes anticipatory control ineffective and the risks borne
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out of the investors’ collective actions, the erratic explosions in the corresponding investor
activity turns systemic. Consequently, the system is introduced with bubbles and crashes
(Wilcox and Fabozzi, 2013).
Now we may explain how this environment leads to an adverse feedback loop. According
to Davis et al. (2010), a shock causes a decline in economic activities with an adverse
feedback loop. The loss of asset values and decline in profits result in increasing default
rates in the real sector and an amplification in loan losses for the intermediaries. Hence,
the drag on the buffer of resources that intermediaries can drawdown with the falling
markets, contributes increasing business cycle volatility and the tightening of liquidity
available in both the market and real sector. Consequently, what follows is a further drop
in asset values and profits, sending the sector into a downward spiral.
All this provides us with a natural foundation from which to investigate and visualise an
information transmission (i.e., signal with frictions) pathway with investors’ changing de-
gree of risk tolerance. This may allow us to predict the crisis transmission pathway, form-
ing a possible early warning system. In what follows, we present dynamic SOM information,
and examine if we can derive crisis generation indicators that correspond with SOM crisis
presented earlier.
Again, drawing on the analogy of a plateau with mid-colours and occasional lighter-
coloured higher features, the interpretation of SOM information is somewhat different than
the interpretation for SOM crisis for two reasons. First, there is an immense network of
fissures running wildly across the plateau with SOM information. This suggests that mar-
ket participants are always riddled with intense information, regardless of crisis or calm
periods. Hence, those speculators with a lack of knowledge may analyse crisis predictions
differently, generating positive and adverse feedback loops as well as reinforcing cycles.
Second, a crevasse would indicate collective risk tolerance resulting from varying levels
of intermediation and signal processing by speculators, indicating that liquidity is being
drawn out of the markets. In contrast, risk-taking is analogous to a crevice in our discus-
sion, which may precede a crisis or may deepen as a crisis unfolds. This is because while
amplifications in signals represent risk aversion, risk tolerance is highlighted by a damp-
ening in the neutrality index. Hence, despite the common parabolic pattern of fissures
in the plateau housing the smaller crevices and gaping crevasses, the interpretations may
change entirely for the maps in figures Figure 11, Figure 12, Figure 13, Figure 14.
In the second half of 1998, burrows and crevices are at the bottom left corner of the
SOM information topography, highlighting that the risk tolerance of Asian investors dom-
inates AC markets during this period. In the subsequent period, the first half of 1999
depicts reinforcing cycles in risk aversion sentiments followed by risk-taking in the devel-
oped markets (OED) coming about from the Asian investors. Both these periods accord
well with the SOM crisis topography outlining crisis transmission from the AC to OED
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markets. The shifting of portfolios from the crisis-ridden Asian markets to the OED mar-
kets shows new corresponding crises transpiring in the OED markets, consistent with the
active hedging phenomenon and leading to elevated market linkages (Kodres and Pritsker,
2002b; Kocaarslan et al., 2017).
Facing the dotcom bubble, emerging deep crevasses running across the OED region on
the top left corner of the plateau scar the topographic formation. This portrays the
dampening of risk tolerance that corresponds to events unfolding in the OED markets,
and may lead to the riskier allocation of assets, as suggested by Kocaarslan et al. (2017).
This in turn, raises the prices of risky assets, emanates investor-based contagion and may
also lead to new crisis formation in the SOMcrisis maps. This is especially apparent in
the first half of 2001. As the SOM crisis maps show, Asian investors pulling investments
out of the OED markets correspond to a gaping new crevasse creeping up in the OED
zone. Hence, the predictability between the SOM crisis maps and SOM information maps
provides us with the early warning system for which we aimed. This also holds for
Lehkonen and Heimonen (2014) theory that in crisis periods, homogeneous information
transmission triggers active hedging, leading to frequent asset reallocation. This, in turn,
induces interdependence. Additionally, this process addresses a crucial network problem.
The maps lay out the role of Asian investors in propagating a crisis emerging from the
OED cluster into the EC cluster, and underscores the importance of a middle node in
transmitting a crisis from A to B.
Both the SOM information and SOM crisis maps revert to somewhat a similar parabolic
pattern, which is slightly more wedged in for SOM information maps, which continues until
the onset of the GFC. During this period, a yawning crevasse runs across the OEE mar-
kets, highlighting a high level of risk intolerance for mostly the Middle Eastern markets
that coincides with the greatest turmoils, including war breaking out in this region with
the US-led Iraq invasion. This is of no surprise; such events would force investors to pull
resources out, and the emerging pattern depicts this loss of risk tolerance.
With the dynamic maps rolling into the periods marking the advent of the GFC, the
bottom right corner of the plateau begins to form a twiggy crevasse that opens up into a
dark void, signifying the full cycle of the GFC. As the GFC subsides, the crevasse fills up,
resembling the very beginning of its formation before disappearing completely. During
this period, the bottom left corner of the SOM information maps depict visible topographic
depressions as holes and burrows. Here again, we draw on an analogy to the changing
dynamics of patterns in risk tolerance that SOM information illuminates. The imminent
GFC, which can also be observed as the scars forming up on the SOM crisis landscape,
marks a time of high-risk evasion in the OED markets and risk-taking among European
and Asian investors. It is possible that the realisation of crisis fear among investors.
Eventually, the GFC swings into full cycle, forcing OED investors to become risk-takers
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while European and Asian investors become risk averse following a flow of capital out of
the OED into the EC and AC markets. This results in gaping crevasses creeping up across
the EC and AC markets located in the SOM crisis maps in the latter half of 2007, as the
heightening sense of potential crisis in this region transmits crisis into these markets.
The mere visibility of the scars opening up in the SOM information maps, along with
the transpiring European debt crisis, creates deep crevasses running across the GC and
OED markets in the SOM crisis maps. With the Greek austerity measures taking effect,
these crevasses fill up, corresponding to the deepening of scars into new crevasses in the
SOM information maps. This suggests that investors across the GC and OEDmarkets resort
to dodging risk, leading to amplifications in crises in 2010 as observed in the SOM crisis
pattern. Investors become risk-takers again as the crisis subsides. This continues up until
the second half of 2012, when investors eventually begin to avert risks again confidence as
builds up in the GC and OED markets. Consequently, this triggers another phase in this
crisis across the affected markets, as investors pull resources out. Risk tolerance reaches
its minimum for the GC and OED markets in the first half of 2016. These patterns are
consistent with the feedback loop argued by Wilcox and Fabozzi (2013) and Kocaarslan
et al. (2017), who showed that a crisis does not subside despite investors becoming risk
averse. Investors react by making risky investment decisions, which pushes the already
high prices of risky assets even higher and assumes lower returns than risk. As a result,
the second half of 2016 scars the plateau with widening crevasses and deep sinkholes.
This time crisis is predominant in the OED markets, and is transmitted to other markets
and the area adjacent to the GC markets to form multiple reinforcing cycles that affect
Asia more than the other markets.
The outcome of the maps produced in Figure 7, Figure 8, Figure 9, Figure 10, Figure 11,
Figure 12, Figure 13, Figure 14 is further reinforced in Table 3 and Table 4. Both of
these tables provide additional insights, as they display the summary statistics of 900
basis classification indices generated from the risk perception matrix and signed spillover
(vulnerability) matrix. Combining the results from both these tables, it is evident that
an amplification in risk tolerance precedes crisis generation. Moreover, amplification in
the vulnerability of markets heightens risk tolerance, forming a diabolic feedback loop.
An agent-based diabolic feedback loop is concentrated out for 1998, 2001, 2002, 2003,
2004, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2017. The efficacy of the
method’s predictive capacity is laid out in the prediction segment of these tables. These
tables show that in the periods immediately before crisis amplifies, investors with public
information attempt to prevent investment losses by pulling capital out of the markets.
Coupled with fire sales and the depreciating value of cross-border assets, this reinforces a
worsening spiral in market. Therefore, these findings provide evidence for the significance
of our approach as an early warning system.
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In summary, we have observed that deciphering the SOM information maps helps us to
make predictions in the SOM crisis maps, and both the systems feed off each other. Hence,
these models connect well to deliver us an early warning system. This system allows us
to devise and interpret one model to make predictions on the other.
In the next section, we take a granular approach and present the impact of COVID-19
outbreak in investors risk preference and a crisis propagation pathway.
8 Impact of COVID-19
The outbreak of COVID-19 that was identified in February 2020 pushed many major
economies towards a recession. According to the World Bank, while global GDP con-
traction exceeded 5.2% advanced economies are expected to shrink by 7% and emerging
economies are expected to shrink by 2.5% when the before the epidemic is neutralised
(Kose et al., 2020). The DJIA, FTSE 100 index, London stock exchange and Tokyo stock
exchange dampens respectively by 12.93%, 9.99%, 24.80% and 20% recording maximum
losses in a single day. The unfolding of the crisis brought about by COVID-19 has led to
a wave of studies in the global literature. In the current tenet of the studies, Akhtaruz-
zaman et al. (2020) and Corbet et al. (2020) focuse on contagion, Baker et al. (2020)
and Ramelli and Wagner (2020) focuse on stock market crashes, Sharif et al. (2020) and
McKibbin and Fernando (2020) focuse on the economic impacts of the crisis and Zhang
et al. (2020) focuse on global financial markets as a whole. While Yarovaya et al. (2020)
provide evidence of the absence of herding behavior under COVID-19 in the cryptocur-
rency market, Conlon and McGee (2020) provides evidence of cryptocurrency markets’
failure in providing a safe heaven for investment. In this section, we take a granular view
in the pre and during COVID-19 periods and examine investors’ risk preferences facing
COVID-19.
Figure 15 provides contour plots of risk preference matrices and vulnerability to systemic
risk matrices. From the contour plot of risk preference matrix it is evident that South
Korea, Germany, China, Australia, Belgium, the USA, Canada, Russia, Norway, Japan,
Israel and Sri Lanka experience drops in risk taking among investors. The market calm-
ness mostly in the advanced markets indicates the fear of economic downturn that grips
the investors facing stringent physical distancing measures in place to battle the spread
of virus, which, in effect, stunting business activities and growth in these economies. In
contrast, developing economies and emerging economies thrive as many of these countries
do not adopt stringent measures such as the developed economies. This market sentiment
complements the predictions presented in the June 2020 World Bank report (Kose et al.,
2020). The importance of the risk preference matrix is highlighted when we observe the
vulnerability to systemic risk matrix presented in figure 15. The systemic risk matrix
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suggests, vulnerability dampens for almost all the markets in the sample, which indicates
heightening disconnect between the markets. Such resilience building is due to expec-
tations regarding the trigger of global crisis and the degree of shocks emanating from
interventions within the markets which simply reduced the systemic risk and connectiv-
ity between the markets except for the USA and its neighboring markets such as Canada.
This also proves that the COVID-19 impact is less systemic in nature and the ongoing
crisis is emerging due to idiosyncratic exogenous shocks corresponding to heterogeneous
interventions and not due to exposure risk, that may trigger a contagion.
Similarly, Figure 16 provides the SOM crisis transmission maps and the SOM information
transmission maps in the post and during COVID-19 outbreak. The SOM information
maps do not change substantially from earlier periods, except for more cracks indicative of
heightening of risk aversion. The consistency in patterns signal no substantial heightening
in the stress classifications corresponding to these periods. More cracks signify jumps in
the degree of risk aversion that complements our findings from contour plots. Most
importantly, we do not see changes in inter-connectivity. The SOM crisis transmission
maps also do not indicate formation of any new feedback loops or dissemination of the
common patterns erupting into random signals across the space. This highlights the
difference between the systemic risk maps during a systemic crisis and a non-systemic
crisis. Systemic crisis transmission maps gauging from the systemic risk parameter indices
capture the effects of systemic crisis more accurately and are not overshadowed by events
that are not systemic to the market.
An important revelation is, while COVID-19 outbreak originates in China, we do not
observe any extreme market movements in China being a ground zero to the pandemic.
Similar to major global markets, we observe market calmness prevailing China as a po-
tential indicator of a future crisis. However, such an indication is not different to South
Korea, Germany, Australia, Belgium, the USA, Canada, Russia, Norway, Japan, Israel
and Sri Lanka markets. This finding clearly shows the position of Chinese market against
the many speculations that grip the pandemic news.
9 Policy implications
Another appealing feature in both the ‘crisis maps’ and ‘information transmission maps’
is that they show the changing dynamics in vulnerability corresponding to risk tolerance
within a system of markets in a readily accessible manner. Although we are able to ex-
tract important information related to the intertwining nature of the markets and risk
tolerance across these markets with unsigned and signed spillover analysis and signed risk
neutrality computed from a structural VAR framework, the ‘crisis maps’ propose comple-
mentary information that outlines a vulnerability transmission pathway. When presented
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along with the information transmission stream flowing out of the collective sentiment in
investor networks, these results lay out a pathway for vulnerability transmission. Hence,
we present an early warning system of contagion without having to exploit systemic risk
estimates.
This provides an additional tool for policymakers and active portfolio managers. The
web of fissures across the system results from a cascade of shocks emerging out of an
origin and travelling on via the network of fissures in the system (e.g., Greece to China
and to Australia). Understanding this association is a key for taking appropriate actions
in preventing a crisis. For example, instead of taking a more drastic approach, such as
blocking a pathway through outright bans on short selling or capital movement restric-
tions, regulators can take a more moderate approach, controlling news borne out of mere
speculation or syndication, which may probably stop a crisis from happening in the first
instance.
In other cases, suddenly emerging sinkholes suggest a high degree of vulnerability for
an individual market or group of markets to shocks from a small set of sources. Thus,
a domestic response to the cause of the crisis may involve repairing macro-economic
fundamentals with traditional approaches, as proposed by Eichengreen et al. (1996);
Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) and Bordo et al. (2001).
10 Conclusion
In this paper, we contributed to the systemic risk literature by providing an early warn-
ing predictor, that does not require a state of art crisis period demarcation technique
to detect potentially emerging crisis. We propose an approach, identifying agents risk
sentiments corresponding to episodes of crisis or potential information regarding an im-
minent crisis. We provide dynamic information transmission maps that allow regulators
to identify points of most effective intervention in the public information transmission
pathway halting a potential for speculative attacks in the market or mere syndication.
This helps to address a long standing issue: knowing how crisis spreads is not enough,
but knowing how to stop is the aim.
• First, we showed how to compute investors’ risk tolerance. The risk tolerance
indices depict herding induced from potential public information on crisis preceding
a crisis and amplifying the effects of crisis. As such, risk tolerance can be a proxy
for the public information transmission index. We found that Asian investors are
becoming more risk-takers in the most recent periods, which is implicit in potentially
contagious Asian markets. With the exception of UK and Singaporean investors,
those from other markets are more risk neutral. However, erratic behaviour escalates
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prior to a crisis. Interestingly, when crisis is imminent, investors become risk averse,
which explains their reluctance in making new investments. Coupled with fire sales
and capital flights, this deepens the effects of an ensuing crisis.
• Next, we demonstrated how to use information transmission maps to analyze signed
dynamic public information transmission (risk tolerance) indices. The dynamic
crisis transmission maps provide predictive visual patterns in the maps comparing
to crisis transmission maps. We conclude that immediately before a crisis, investors
turn to be risk averse. Contagion transmission runs along the information pathway
and passes through the plateau. Hence, the risk aversion pathway precedes the
crisis transmission pathway and provides a means to detect crisis earlier.
• We investigate the influence of COVID-19 on the global markets and show how
its impact on systemic transmission and risk preferences is different from that of a
systemic crisis.
This finding will allows regulators to short circuit crisis transmission by intervening into
the public information transmission pathway. Further, regulators can dig deeper into
the potential nature of what sourcing information transmission and wield control over
speculation or planned syndication. The maps make potential information transmission
pathway more conspicuous. In the aftermath of the GFC, policymakers came together in
realising the importance of identifying vulnerability to crises originating elsewhere and in
coordinating actions to prevent such transmissions.
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11 Appendix
11.1 Figures
(a) Asian crisis markets with transmission
(b) Asian crisis markets with vulnerability
Figure 1: Asian crisis markets
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(a) Export crisis markets with transmission
(b) Export crisis markets with vulnerability
Figure 2: Export crisis markets
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(a) Greek crisis markets with transmission
(b) Greek crisis markets with vulnerability
Figure 3: Greek crisis markets
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(a) Oil exporting developed markets with transmission
(b) Oil exporting developed markets with vulnerability
Figure 4: Oil exporting developed markets
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(a) Oil exporting emerging markets with transmission
(b) Oil exporting emerging markets with vulnerability
Figure 5: Oil exporting emerging markets
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Figure 7: Dynamic crisis transmission maps from 1998-2003
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Figure 8: Dynamic crisis transmission maps from 2004-2009
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Figure 9: Dynamic crisis transmission maps from 2010-2015
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Figure 10: Dynamic crisis transmission maps from 2016-2017
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Figure 11: Dynamic information transmission maps from 1998-2003
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Figure 12: Dynamic information transmission maps from 2004-2009
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Figure 13: Dynamic information transmission maps from 2010-2015
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Figure 14: Dynamic information transmission maps from 2016-2017
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(a) COVID-19 impact on Risk Preference
(b) COVID-19 impact on Systemic Risk
Figure 15: COVID-19 contour plots
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Figure 16: Dynamic information transmission and crisis transmission maps pre and during COVID-19
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Table 1: Countries by analytical group
Exporters Commodity Oil Exporters Greek Crisis Asian Crisis Conduit
Exporters Countries
EC CE OE GRC AC CC
Australia Australia Canada Austria Australia Japan
China Canada Ecuador Belgium China USA
Chile France Iraq7 Croatia India
Germany Japan Israel Greece Malaysia
Nigeria New Zealand Kuwait Ireland Philippines
Norway UK Nigeria Portugal Singapore
Russia Saudi Arabia South Korea
Saudi Arabia Venezeula Sri Lanka
South Korea USA Thailand
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive Statistics USA AUS IND JAP MYS NZL SGP
Min -6.629 -8.364 -9.852 -8.239 -19.017 -5.406 -8.848
Max 6.202 8.107 10.783 6.618 17.587 5.138 8.071
Median 0.049 0.069 0.106 0.037 0.022 0.062 0.047
Mean 0.018 0.021 0.038 0.009 0.019 0.017 0.026
Standard Deviation 0.817 1.026 1.244 0.965 1.105 0.832 0.993
JB test p Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Critical Value 5.951 6.008 6.043 6.015 5.986 5.992 5.983
PHL KOR SLK THA NIG VEN KWT
Min -8.23 -12.50 -9.95 -10.25 -17.09 -145.75 -62.81
Max 13.890 12.320 11.797 15.888 6.777 20.320 62.554
Median 0.044 0.000 0.000 0.029 0.000 0.008 0.0043
Mean 0.024 0.044 0.025 0.034 0.007 -0.003 0.012
Standard Deviation 1.181 1.514 0.858 1.321 1.129 3.557 1.871
JB test p Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Critical Value 6.019 5.975 5.987 5.988 6.005 5.995 5.996
IRQ SAU CHN ISR CAD GRC PRT
Min -41.219 -10.573 -7.863 -6.253 -9.432 -10.350 -7.060
Max 40.780 7.914 6.493 6.506 7.828 8.331 7.494
Median 0.000 0.008 0.020 0.063 0.084 0.064 0.039
Mean 0.027 0.022 0.036 0.028 0.019 -0.012 -0.008
Standard Deviation 2.508 1.013 1.243 0.986 0.985 1.523 1.041
JB test p Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Critical Value 6.003 5.948 6.010 5.996 6.012 5.964 5.986
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Table 3: Summary Statistics of 900 basis agents risk perception classification
Actual 1998:1 1998:2 1999:1 1999:2 2000:1 2000:2 2001:1 2001:2 2002:1 2002:2 2003:1 2003:2 2004:1 2004:2 2005:1
Min. 4.00 5.00 6.00 3.00 13.00 13.00 3.00 33.00 10.00 2.00 24.00 10.00 16.00 7.00 34.00
1st Qu. 214.0 194.0 190.0 242.0 191.0 207.00 219.0 275.0 207.0 275.0 281.0 262.0 192.0 190.0 336.0
Median 441.0 415.0 444.0 528.0 409.0 422.0 465.0 472.0 426.0 434.0 463.0 441.0 394.0 423.0 528.0
Mean 471.0 463.8 462.9.2 511.1 437.1 451.6 479.2 494.4 443.7 492.8 482.7 485 452.1 455.6 545.6
3rd Qu. 744.0 712.0 716.0 744.0 647.0 689.0 727.0 703.0 692.0 721.0 688.0 743.0 716.0 732.0 800.0
Max. 956.0 957.0 954.0 957.0 955.0 952.0 957.0 960.0 939.0 959.0 952.0 961.0 953.0 956.0 952.0
Actual 2005:2 2006:1 2006:2 2007:1 2007:2 2008:1 2008:2 2009:1 2009:2 2010:1 2010:2 2011:1
Min. 26.00 5.00 5.00 6.00 3.00 21.00 3.00 8.00 26.00 16.00 10.00 3.00
1st Qu. 172.0 200.0 207.0 232.0 271.0 207.0 247.00 214.0 258.0 190.0 257.0 185.0
Median 378.0 382.0 462.0 430.0 579.0 432.0 435.0 492.0 526.0 380.0 471.0 411.0
Mean 408.6 428.6 469.5 473.6 525.6 461.9 478.3 483.5 506.4 428.8 504.6 420.0
3rd Qu. 529.0 629.0 695.0 727.0 756.0 716.0 709.0 744.0 748.0 672.0 799.0 630.0
Max. 960.0 957.0 946.0 957.0 960.0 952.0 960.0 955.0 957.0 959.0 960.0 952.0
Prediction 2011:2 2012:1 2012:2 2013:1 2013:2 2014:1 2014:2 2015:1 2015:2 2016:1 2016:2 2017:1
Min. 14.00 27.00 6.00 6.00 22.00 8.0 6.00 5.000 5.00 1.00 6.00 28.00
1st Qu. 229.0 175.0 180.0 260.0 242.0 230.0 201.0 205.0 199.0 247.0 228.0 261.0
Median 422.0 371.0 462.0 505.0 471.0 479.0 440.0 414.0 471.0 441.0 458.0 440.0
Mean 465.7 430.7 463.2 491 476.9 484.3 467.5 456.8 490.4 483.6 460.9 477.8
3rd Qu. 717.0 647.0 705.0 727.0 723.0 765.0 752.0 678.0 805.0 744.0 658.0 695.0
Max. 957.0 957.0 958.0 957.0 957.0 952.0 956.0 951.0 956.0 951.0 960.0 947.0
Table 4: Summary Statistics of 900 basis signed risk classification
Actual 1998:1 1998:2 1999:1 1999:2 2000:1 2000:2 2001:1 2001:2 2002:1 2002:2 2003:1 2003:2 2004:1 2004:2 2005:1
Min. 4.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 12.00 10.00 10.00 1.00 1.00 14.00 14.00 9.00 6.00 1.00 2.00
1st Qu. 215.0 282.0 230.0 200.0 216.0 240.00 267.0 203.0 298.0 240.0 206.0 262.0 283.0 230.0 280.0
Median 461.0 508.0 507.0 500.0 435.0 488.0 457.0 454.0 533.0 519.0 472.0 501.0 533.0 426.0 573.0
Mean 476.9 495 497.5 482.9 435.4 475.9 480 461.4 520.2 491.8 468.7 507.7 513.5 459.1 513.8
3rd Qu. 748.0 708.0 761.0 716.0 646.0 708.0 710.0 720.0 748.0 716.0 728.0 761.0 762.0 701.0 714.0
Max. 961.0 944.0 961.0 959.0 955.0 951.0 948.0 945.0 959.0 961.0 941.0 961.0 946.0 957.0 957.0
Actual 2005:2 2006:1 2006:2 2007:1 2007:2 2008:1 2008:2 2009:1 2009:2 2010:1 2010:2 2011:1
Min. 11.00 8.00 2.00 11.00 1.00 6.00 5.00 3.00 6.00 1.00 2.00 22.00
1st Qu. 250.0 174.0 247.0 243.0 236.0 227.0 250.00 198.0 257.0 228.0 202.0 238.0
Median 500.0 360.0 510.0 505.0 496.0 481.0 499.0 372.0 496.0 484.0 461.0 420.0
Mean 491.4 482.4 485.5 493.6 475.3 491.2 485.2 428.8 486.8 471.1 458.9 443.8
3rd Qu. 713.0 701.0 714.0 722.0 697.0 758.0 745.0 716.0 726.0 699.0 693.0 679.0
Max. 953.0 961.0 940.0 939.0 960.0 956.0 959.0 961.0 956.0 959.0 956.0 939.0
Prediction 2011:2 2012:1 2012:2 2013:1 2013:2 2014:1 2014:2 2015:1 2015:2 2016:1 2016:2 2017:1
Min. 6.00 20.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 18.0 11.00 1.000 5.00 1.00 5.00 16.00
1st Qu. 231.0 259.0 233.0 259.0 247.0 243.0 279.0 293.0 234.0 227.0 247.0 287.0
Median 462.0 483.0 474.0 506.0 535 491.0 496.0 513.0 505.0 432.0 410.0 492.0
Mean 489.6 495.2 464.7 492.2 506.8 493.3 491.2 511.3 498.9 455.6 446.9 512.7
3rd Qu. 767.0 746.0 679.0 748.0 770.0 746.0 713.0 699.0 762.0 697.0 669.0 752.0
Max. 961.0 936.0 958.0 945.0 958.0 952.0 961.0 959.0 961.0 960.0 961.0 945.0
56This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3664751
